We investigate two mean-variance optimization problems for a single cohort of workers in an accumulation phase of a defined benefit pension scheme. Since the mortality intensity evolves as a general Markov diffusion process, the liability is random. The fund manager aims to cover this uncertain liability via controlling the asset allocation strategy and the contribution rate. In order to have a more realistic model, we study the case when the risk aversion depends dynamically on current wealth. By solving an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, we obtain analytical solutions for the equilibrium strategies and value function which depend on both current wealth and mortality intensity. Moreover, results for the constant risk aversion are presented as special cases of our models.
Introduction
The optimal management of dynamic pension schemes is becoming increasingly important since pension funds currently play an influential role in financial markets for their high capitalization, and participants are starting to pay more attention to the security of promised benefits.
There are two major types of pension funds; defined contribution (DC) pension plans and defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In a DC scheme contributions are fixed, and benefits depend on the returns of the fund portfolio, so the participants bear the financial risk. In a DB scheme benefits are fixed in advance by the sponsor, and contributions are set in order to maintain the fund in balance. Future benefits due to the participants are, thus, a liability for the sponsor who bears the financial risk.
Our aim in this paper is to analyse a DB pension scheme which is a common model in the employment system. DB pension funds have been extensively studied in the literature. They have been generally modelled as linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control problems, and the manager's objectives are usually related to the minimization of the risk of solvency and contribution. See, for instance, the work of Cairns [3] , Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero [9] [10] [11] , Ngwira and Gerrard [15] and Delong et al. [4] .
The mean-variance (MV) approach proposed by Markowitz [14] is well known as the foundation of modern finance theory and a vast number of papers have been published on this topic. Most of them deal with the single-period case, since the MV criterion in the multiperiod framework lacks the iterated expectation property, which results in inconsistency in MV problems in the sense that the Bellman optimality principle does not hold, and consequently the traditional dynamic programming approach cannot be directly applied.
In the literature, there are two basic ways of handling time-inconsistent problems. One is to find the pre-committed strategies, where "optimal" is interpreted as "optimal from the point of view of the initial time". In the context of MV portfolio choice, the traditional objective can be described as minimizing
over all admissible policies, where γ is a pre-specified risk aversion coefficient.
The term "pre-commitment" involves the target given implicitly by considering the variance as the quadratic deviation from the target E 0,x [X π (T )], that is, the manager pre-commits to the target determined at time 0 but does not update the target at subsequent dates. Li and Ng [12] and Zhou and Li [20] developed an embedding technique to transform the original time-inconsistent problem into a tractable stochastic LQ problem in discrete and continuous time settings, respectively. In the pension fund literature, similar problems are investigated by Delong et al. [4] and Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero [10] . Note that all these works derived only pre-committed strategies.
Another possibility for dealing with time-inconsistent problems is to study them within a game-theoretic framework and seek the corresponding time-consistent strategy (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point), which means that the optimal strategy derived at time t will agree with that derived at time t + ∆t. Strotz [17] first formally treated a deterministic Ramsay problem which was time inconsistent using the game-theoretic approach. Björk and Murgoci [1] considered a fairly general class of time-inconsistent objective functions in a Markovian setting, derived an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and provided a verification theorem. Björk et al. [2] further studied the time-consistent strategy for a continuous-time MV portfolio problem where the risk aversion depends dynamically on current wealth.
In addition, Hu et al. [7] investigated an equilibrium for a general time-inconsistent stochastic LQ control problem within the class of open-loop controls. Zeng and Li [18] explored time-consistent strategies for optimal investment and reinsurance problems under an MV criterion in a Black-Scholes market. Zeng et al. [19] extended the model to incorporate jumps, and Li and Li [13] focused on the case with state-dependent risk aversion.
It seems very difficult to require investors not to deviate from the optimal strategy chosen at the initial time during the entire investment horizon. A reasonable investor sitting at time t would consider starting from t + ∆t, and would follow the policy that would be optimal sitting at time t + ∆t. Therefore, in our paper, we take the time-inconsistency seriously by updating the target to E t,x,λ [X π (T ) − Da(λ(T ))] and considering a state-dependent risk aversion. More explicitly, we consider an objective function of the form
where Da(λ(T )) is the liability of the fund and µ 1 x + µ 2 represents the state-dependent risk aversion. To our knowledge, little work has been done in the pension fund literature on timeconsistent strategies for portfolio optimization problems, except for the work of He and Liang [5] who studied the time-consistent investment strategy for a DC pension plan. In this paper, we investigate the optimal time-consistent investment strategy and supplementary contribution rate for a DB pension scheme under the MV criterion. The evolution of the mortality intensity follows a general Markov diffusion process. We solve two problems. The supplementary contribution rate in the first problem is set by the spread method of the fund amortization, so that the control process depends only on the investment strategy. In the second problem, the objective is to determine the contribution rate and the investment strategy, minimizing both the contribution and the solvency risk. Delong et al. [4] considered a similar model. However, they managed to obtain the precommitted strategies for the optimization problems.
In this paper, we also study a state-dependent risk aversion, where the risk aversion dynamically depends on current wealth. For a constant risk aversion, the optimal amount invested in the risky asset is independent of current wealth, which is economically unreasonable. We formulate our problem in a game-theoretic framework and provide analytical solutions where the equilibrium investment strategy and supplementary contribution rate are dependent on both the current wealth and the mortality intensity. Moreover, results for constant risk aversion are derived as comparisons with the general cases.
The outline of this paper is as follows. We introduce the model and basic assumptions in Section 2. In Section 3, we formulate the MV optimization problem within a game-theoretic framework and provide a verification theorem. An explicit time-consistent strategy and an equilibrium value function are derived. In Section 4, a generalized MV problem with the contribution risk is also considered and analytical results are obtained. Finally, we give numerical examples to illustrate our results in Section 5. [4] Optimal portfolio for defined benefit pension schemes 69
Model and assumptions
We consider a complete probability space (Ω, F , P) with a filtration F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T for a finite T which denotes the maximum future lifetime of the fund's participants. The filtration F consists of two subfiltrations: we set F = F F ∨ F M , where F F contains information about the financial market and F M contains information about the mortality intensity. Suppose that the subfiltrations F F and F M are independent of each other. Let E denote the expectation with respect to P.
The financial market
In the financial market, there are one risk-free asset and one risky asset. The price of the risk-free asset R(t) is modelled by dR(t) = rR(t) dt, and the dynamics of the price of the risky asset follows a jump-diffusion process
where r, σ, µ are positive constants and µ > r. Here, {W(t)} 0≤t≤T is a standard F Fadapted Brownian motion and M(dt, dz) = M(dt, dz) − ν(dz) dt is an F F -compensated Poisson martingale measure, where M is a Poisson random measure, independent of W, with the intensity measure ν satisfying
The pension model
Denote by λ(t) the level of the mortality intensity of the fund participants, t years after they enter the plan. This evolves as a general Markov diffusion process given by
where W(t) is an F M -adapted BM independent of W. Assume that the coefficients fulfil the following regularity conditions to ensure the existence of a strictly positive solution to (2.1).
continuous, locally Lipschitz continuous in λ and uniformly continuous in t. (A2) There exists a sequence (D n ) n∈N of bounded domains with closure D n ⊆ (0, ∞), and n≥1 D n = (0, ∞), such that θ(t, λ) and η(t, λ) are uniformly Lipschitz
In this paper, we analyse a DB pension fund during the accumulation phase [0, T ], where T < T denotes the retirement time of all participants. Then the liability of the plan, also known as the expected discounted present value of future pension benefits to the cohort of the participants conditioned on the given level of the mortality intensity at time T , is equal to
where D is the promised pension benefit, defined in advance, and the residual probability of payments after time T is set to zero. Let X(t) be the value of the accumulated fund at time t, AL(t) the actuarial liability, and C(t) the contribution rate which funds the liability and consists of two elements: the normal cost rate NC(t) and the supplementary cost rate SC(t) amortizing the unfunded actuarial liability, which is defined as UAL(t) = AL(t) − X(t−). Then X(t) satisfies the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
where π(t) is the amount invested in the risky asset.
Denote by M(t) a distribution function on [0, T ], which represents the percentage of the actuarial value of the future benefits (2.2) accumulated during the first t years. We assume that M : [0, T ] → [0, 1] is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and its density function m(t) is Lipschitz continuous on [0, T ]. The actuarial liability and the normal cost can be defined as in the paper by Delong et al. [4] :
where ρ is the fund's valuation rate. Moreover, we investigate two MV optimization problems. In the first one, the supplementary contribution rate is set as
where κ is some predefined constant. The value of the fund process (X π (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) depends only on the investment strategy π. In the second one, we add the supplementary contribution rate into our optimization problem and minimize the MV objective along with the expected value of squares of future supplementary costs.
Mean-variance optimization problem
In this section, we consider the optimal investment strategy for a DB pension scheme where the supplementary contribution rate is predetermined as in (2.5). The manager aims to manage the fund in order to cover the liability Da(λ(T )) at the retirement time T . In this case, the dynamics of the fund process X π (t) can be given by
Moreover, an investment strategy π(t) is admissible if it satisfies the following conditions:
is a predictable mapping with respect to F t .
(ii)
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The set of all admissible strategies is denoted by A.
In the literature, MV problems are usually transformed into LQ control problems, which can be solved by standard methods. Contrary to the existing literature in this field, our paper aims to obtain the optimal time-consistent policies instead of the precommitted policies.
Our main goal is to formalize the MV optimization problem without precommitment, and consider a state-dependent risk aversion. Thus, the objective function is of the form
2) where µ 1 , µ 2 are constants and the term µ 1 x + µ 2 represents the state-dependent risk aversion. This problem can be viewed as a dynamic MV problem, we analyse it in a game-theoretic framework which is developed by Björk and Murgoci [1].
Definition 3.1. An admissible controlπ is an equilibrium control law if for any given π ∈ R, h > 0 and (t,
where the control law
The corresponding equilibrium value function V is defined by
We will now provide a verification theorem for the MV problem (3.2) without precommitment. To generalize this theorem, we consider a general optimization problem of the form
where f is a function in
, continuously differentiable with respect to the first variable, and has continuous derivatives up to order 2 with other variables), and
In particular, if we set 
where
with f = f (t, x, λ, G, H), G = G(t, x, λ) and H = H(t, x, λ) for simplicity, and
and the equilibrium control law is given byπ.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4.1 by Björk and Murgoci [1] (see Appendix).
3.1. Solution to the optimization problem We derive the optimal time-consistent investment strategy and the value function for problem (3.2). In this case, the function f is given by (3.3) , that is,
Thus,
According to Theorem 3.2, equation (3.4) can be rewritten as
By the linear structure of the dynamics of X π (t) and the boundary conditions, it is natural to guess that
withā(T ) = 1, b(T, λ) = −Da(λ); and
Substituting W(t, x, λ), G(t, x, λ) and their corresponding derivatives into (3.7) yields
Differentiating with respect to π and setting the derivative to zero, we obtain the value of the equilibrium control laŵ
Instead of analysing the above equality directly, we make the assumption that
with k 1 (T ) = µ 1β , k 2 (T, λ) = µ 2β . Then, inserting (3.10) into (3.9), we obtain
Equating coefficients of x 2 , x and constant terms to zero, we get
14)
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Similarly, substituting G(t, x, λ) and (3.10) into (3.5) leads tō
To ensure the above equality, we requirē a t +ā(t)(r − κ) +ā(t)(µ − r)k 1 (t) = 0 (3.16) and
From (3.16) and the boundary conditionā(T ) = 1, we obtain
In addition, inserting H(t, x, λ) and (3.10) into (3.6) yields
where β = (µ − r)/β. Combining the coefficients of x 2 , we get q t + 2q(t)(r − κ) + 2q(t)(µ − r)k 1 (t) + q(t)βk 2 1 (t) = 0, with the boundary condition q(T ) = 1. Hence
On the other hand, from the fact that
and the conjecture (3.8), we obtain
Using (3.11) and (3.18)-(3.20), we find the integral equation
Next, we derive the expression for k 2 (t, λ). From (3.12) and (3.20), we get
The partial derivatives are
Substituting these into (3.14), collecting the similar terms and using (3.17) yields
From the boundary condition k 2 (T, λ) = µ 2β , we can state the Feynman-Kac representation for k 2 (t, λ) as follows:
Combining (2.3) and (2.4), and applying Fubini's theorem, the Markov property of the mortality intensity and the law of iterated expectations lead to
. Based on the Theorem 1 in Heath and Schweizer [6] , a(t, λ) on [0, T ] × R + satisfies the partial differential equation [12] Optimal portfolio for defined benefit pension schemes 77
with boundary condition a(T, λ) = Da(λ).
We combine the above results in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. For the mean-variance problem (3.2), the equilibrium control is expressed asπ
where k 1 (t) and k 2 (t, λ) are given by (3.21) and (3.22), respectively. Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium value function is expressed as V(t, x, λ) = A(t)x 2 + B(t, λ)x + C(t, λ), where the functions A, B and C are given by the expressions in (3.13)-(3.15) , respectively. Remark 3.5. From Björk et al. [2] , the above integral equation satisfied by k 1 (t) admits a unique solution. We can use the analogous recursive algorithm numerically for the determination of k 1 (t). Construct a sequence k 
Special case
We consider the case where µ 1 = 0, that is, the risk aversion coefficient is constant. By setting µ 1 = 0, we see that k 1 (t) ≡ 0 is the root of the integral equation (3.21). Simplifying the expression (3.22) for k 2 (t, λ), we get k 2 (t, λ) = µ 2β e −(r−κ)(T −t) . Hence, the equilibrium control is given bŷ π(t, x, λ) = µ 2β e −(r−κ)(T −t) .
Additionally, from (3.13), (3.14) and (3.16) and their corresponding boundary conditions, we obtain
Substituting the values ofā(t) and k 2 (t, λ) into (3.17), and by applying the FeynmanKac formula, we get
Moreover, integration by parts yields
Similarly, from (3.15) we get
Hence,
and the variance is given by
We observe that the optimal time-consistent investment strategy is independent of the current wealth x and the current mortality intensity λ. Therefore, from an economic point of view, the equilibrium solution for the constant risk aversion is economically unreasonable, as stated by Björk et al. [2] and Li and Li [13] .
Generalized mean-variance optimization problem
In this section, we solve a generalized problem which is to minimize the MV objective of the terminal debt X π (T ) − Da(λ(T )) along with the contribution risk SC 2 on the interval [0, T ]. Minimization of the contribution risk has been explored, for example, in Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero [9] [10] [11] , Ngwira and Gerrard [15] and Delong et al. [4] . Thus, we consider an optimization problem
In this case, the wealth process X π,SC (t) evolves as
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(i) For all t ∈ [0, T ], π(t) and SC(t) are predictable mappings with respect to F t .
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted by B.
As in the previous section, we define the equilibrium control law and equilibrium value function similarly and provide a verification theorem including the supplementary cost rate. Definition 4.1. We say that an admissible controlΠ is an equilibrium control law if for any fixed real numbers π, SC, h > 0 and (t,
where the control law Π h is given by
The corresponding equilibrium value function, V 1 , is defined by
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that there exist three real-valued functions W(t, x, λ), G * (t, x, λ),
, and the equilibrium control law is given byΠ.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
Solution to the generalized optimization problem
In this subsection, we try to find the time-consistent strategies and the value function for the generalized problem (4.1). Similarly to Section 3, we guess that
2 . Substituting W(t, x, λ), G * (t, x, λ) and their corresponding derivatives into (4.6) and (4.7), we obtain the values of the equilibrium control lawπ and SC as follows:
Instead of analysing the above equalities directly, we make the following assumptions:
12)
Then, by substitution of (4.8)-(4.10) into (4.3), we obtain
Similarly, we plug G * (t, x, λ), (4.9) and (4.10) into (4.4), thereby obtaining
To ensure the above equality, we requirẽ a t +ã(t)r +ã(t)(µ − r)k 1 (t) +ã(t)c 1 (t) = 0, (4.18)
From (4.18) and the boundary conditionã(T ) = 1, we obtaiñ
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Moreover, from
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Substituting the values ofã(t), c 2 (t) and k 2 (t) into (4.17) and (4.19) , and by applying the Feynman-Kac formula, we get b(t, λ) = E t,λ [Da(λ(T ))] 
Numerical results
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate our results. We consider the cohort of workers who join the plan at the age of 45 and retire at the age of 65, so that t = 0, T = 20. The maximum future lifetime is taken to be 100 years, and T = 55. We assume that the mortality intensity follows the Vasicek model dλ(t) = 0.078 282λ(t) dt + 0.001 606 dW(t), which has been considered by Jalen and Mamon [8] and Qian et al. [16] . The financial market parameters are r = 0.05, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2, D = 1000, ρ = 0.08, m(t) = 1/20, κ = 0 and ν = 0.
Figures 1-5 show the graphical results of the optimal investment strategy in Theorem 3.4. In Figure 1 we observe that k 1 (t) is increasing with t, and for a fixed t, the value of k 1 (t) when µ 1 = 0.6 is larger than that when µ 1 = 0.3. We plot the function k 2 (t, λ) for µ 1 = 0.3 and µ 2 = 0.5 in Figure 2 . The changes in k 2 (t, λ) with respect to t and λ are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively. In Figure 5 we show the relationship between the optimal investment amount and the wealth level, when [ 
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